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THE TAX PROFESSIONAL AND THE
NEW TAX COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENT
MARVIN J. GARBIS
Developments, commencing in 1975 and culminating with the
T.E.F.R.A. (Tax Equity and Financial Responsibility Act) legislation
of 1982, have created a new tax compliance environment. These devel-
opments, discussed herein, have changed significantly the taxpayer's
exposure to the Internal Revenue Service with respect to income tax
returns that are determined to understate his correct liability. The de-
velopments have, more significantly, made the tax professional more
accountable to the Internal Revenue Service and to clients for return
reporting positions which are not upheld.
Philosophically, in the new environment a tax return is expected to
be more nearly a statement of the taxpayer's belief of his correct tax
liability than a ticket to the audit lottery and an "opening bid" to com-
mence negotiations.
The Former (Pre-1975) Compliance Picture
In the former (which may be defined as the pre-1975) compliance
environment there was, effectively, a built-in incentive for taxpayers and
their advisors to take an aggressive (just short of negligent or fraudu-
lent) attitude with regard to tax planning and tax return reporting.
So long as the taxpayer's return was not susceptible to a fraud or
negligence penalty, it constituted a "ticket" to the "audit lottery". This
lottery was a "no lose" game for the taxpayer. If the return was not
selected for audit, the taxpayer won because his liability was only the
amount which he had presented on his return. On the other hand, if
the return was selected for audit the taxpayer would end up paying only
the tax which he properly owed, without penalty absent negligence or
fraud. Moreover, in those pre-1975 days, the taxpayers' liability for
interest was fixed at 6% (simple) per annum-generally a bargain rate
in modern times. Therefore, the taxpayer would actually gain from
having the use of his tax money at a simple 6% interest rate during
the period between the due date of the return and the time when he was
forced to pay the determined tax deficiency.
The principal civil tax penalties upon which the Service relied to
enforce compliance were dependent upon the subjective intent of the
taxpayer. If any part of an understatement on the subject tax return
was due to fraud then the taxpayer was subject to a penalty of 50% of
the entire understatement (not just the fraudulent portion).' If any
I IRC § 6653(b).
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part of an understatement on the subject tax return was due to negli-
gence (or the nonfraudulent disregard of rules and regulations) then
the taxpayer was subject to a penalty of 5% of the entire understate-
ment (not just the portion attributable to negligence or disregard) .2
In order to impose the fraud penalty the Internal Revenue Service
had to prove, by "clear and convincing evidence" - that the taxpayer in-
tended to evade his tax liability.
With respect to the underlying facts, unless it was established that the
taxpayer knew that the facts upon which his return reporting position
was based were untrue, the fraud penalty would not be applicable. With
respect to the applicable legal principles, the taxpayer would avoid the
penalty if there was any rational argument in support of his legal
position.
The avoidance of the negligence penalty with respect to positions of
law required more, but only slightly more, support for the taxpayer
than did the avoidance of the fraud penalty. So long as there was a
reasonable basis for the taxpayer's position the penalty would not be
applicable. A "reasonable basis" for a legal position can exist even
though it is far more likely than not that the taxpayer would lose if
the issue were raised by the Internal Revenue Service.'
In short, as a practical matter the taxpayer was not liable for the
traditional, intent dependent, penalties for fraud or negligence so long
as there was virtually any support for the legal positions taken and so
long as he exercised a modest degree of care to see that the facts relied
upon in return preparation were not incorrect.
Prior to the recent compliance developments the tax professional
could effectively provide his client with a virtual guarantee that there
would be no penalty exposure with regard to aggressive tax return posi-
tions. The professional could give an opinion that there was a "reason-
able basis" for a reporting position even if the professional believed
that it was most unlikely that the position would be upheld.5 Except for
those egregious situations justifying criminal prosecution or possible re-
ferral for professional disciplinary action, the Internal Revenue Service
had no effective means to control the tax professional's conduct. More-
over, since it was the taxpayer who was the beneficiary of the profes-
sional's opinion by virtue of the virtual immunity to penalty it provided,
there was little to inhibit tax professionals from participating in, and
often promoting, aggressive tax planning and tax return reporting. In-
deed, some have observed that those tax professionals who chose to
2IRC § 6653(a).
3 IRC § 7454(a).
4 Rowen, When May A Lawyer Advise A Client That He May Take A Position
On A Tax Return, 29 Tax Lawyer 237 (1976).
5 Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 314, 51 A.B.A.J. 671 (1965).
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engage in such activities may have built up clientele at the expense of
their more restrained professional colleagues."
The tax professional now must practice in a new, tougher tax com-
pliance environment. There is no longer the "free lunch" of unrealisti-
cally low interest rates. The Internal Revenue Service no longer lacks
any civil penalty which can be imposed directly upon the professional.
Moreover, there is now a definite "downside risk" to the taxpayer for
taking aggressive tax return positions.
Interest On Deficiencies
Today, there is no inherent benefit to the deferral of one's tax pay-
ments by virtue of the rate of interest charged on tax deficiencies. To
the contrary, at this time, the tax professional must weigh the cost of
interest on deficiencies heavily in the scale when advising with regard to
debatable tax return reporting positions.
In 1975 the Internal Revenue Code was amended to establish a new
rate of interest of 9%, effective July 1, 1975, and to provide for possible
adjustments to the interest rate each February 1 (starting with February
1, 1976), depending upon the prime interest rate charged by banks the
previous September. The adjustments were to be made no more fre-
quently than every two years. In 1981 the Code was amended to make
the interest rates on deficiencies even more responsive to changing
market interest rates. Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
("ERTA"), interest rates were to be adjusted each year on January 1
(starting with January 1, 1983) depending upon the prime rates charged
by banks the previous September.8 The interest rates on tax deficiencies
for all periods prior to the effectiveness of TEFRA were as follows:
Rate of Interest
Period (simple)
Prior to July 1, 1975 ................. .......... 6%
July 1, 1975 to January 31, 1976 .................. 9%
February 1, 1976 to January 31, 1978 ............. 7%
February 1, 1978 to January 31, 1980 ............... 6%
February 1, 1980 to January 31, 1982 .............. 12%
February 1, 1982 to December 31, 1982 ............ 20%
6 Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic, A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics and
Tax Reform, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1553 (1980).
IRC § 6621. As amended by Section 7(a) (1) of Public Law 93-625, January 3,
1975, effective July 1, 1975.
8 IRC § 6621. As amended by Section 711(c) of the 1981 Economic Recovery
Tax Act, P.L. 97-34 (August 13, 1981).
TAX CONFERENCE
TEFRA dramatically changed the situation with respect to interest
charged on tax deficiencies commencing January 1, 1983. The rate of
interest has been made more sensitive to changing market interest rates
and is now subject to possible adjustment twice a year, each January 1
and July 1, depending upon the "adjusted prime rate charged by banks"
during the six month period ending the previous September 30 (for the
January 1 rate) or the previous March (for the July 1 rate). 9 Even
more significant was the change from simple interest to interest which
is compounded daily (effective for interest accruing on deficiencies after
December 31, 1982).10 As of this writing, the post-1982 interest charged
on tax deficiencies is as follows:
Rate
Period (Compounded Daily)
January 1, 1983 to June 30, 1983 .................. 16%
July 1, 1983 to December 31, 1983 ................. 11%
January 1, 1984 to June 30, 1984 .................. 11%
The new structure for interest on tax deficiencies, particularly the
relationship to actual market rates and the daily compounding of inter-
est, creates a new downside risk for many taxpayers who are taking
aggressive tax return positions. At the least, the interest on a possible
tax deficiency is an important factor to be considered.
The Return Preparer Penalties
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976 "1 Congress added return preparer
penalties to the Internal Revenue Code. In addition to detailed provi-
sions regarding the "mechanical" aspects of return preparation, 12 the
new provisions established a $100 per return penalty imposed for an
understatement due to negligence or the intentional disregard of rules
and regulations3 and a $500 per return penalty for an understatement
due to a willful attempt to understate the liability.' 4 The preparer penal-
ties are not restricted in application to those who physically prepare the
tax return. One can be a preparer for purposes of the penalties if he,
for example, gives advice as to a material entry on the return. 5
9 IRC § 6621.
20 IRC § 6622.
"' P.L. 94-455 (October 4, 1976).
1' There are penalties imposed for failure to comply with detailed rules regard-
ing signatures, copies, information returns, etc. which are not pertinent to this
discussion. See IRC § 6695.
Is IRC § 6694(a).
14 IRC § 6694(b).
15 See Benjamin, Definition of a Preparer-Who is He?, 10 Tax Adviser 516
(1979).
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The preparer penalties did not impose any novel standards of conduct
for the tax professional, for the penalties pertinent to this discussion
were imposed only for fraud or negligence. However, the preparer pen-
alties were of major significance because they injected into the tax com-
pliance system civil penalties which were applicable to those who were
not taxpayers. Hence, in the context of a discussion of the new compli-
ance environment, these penalties are of primary importance as a first
step in the process of making those who participate in another's under-
statement of tax liability directly responsible to the Internal Revenue
Service.
The Valuation Overstatement Penalty
In ERTA,'16 in 1981, Congress added a totally new penalty to the
Internal Revenue Code to create a "downside risk" for those taxpayers
who understated their liabilities due to an overstatement of the value (or
basis) of property.
The valuation overstatement penalty is applicable if an individual,
closely held corporation' or personal service corporation", has an un-
derpayment of income tax 9 due to a valuation overstatement.20 An
overstatement of value (or adjusted basis) exists if the determined value
(or adjusted basis) is less than the amount claimed on the return. The
amount of the valuation overstatement penalty is determined by the
ratio (expressed as a percentage) that the claimed value (or basis)
bears to the determined value (or basis), as follows:
From 150% to 200% the penalty is 10%.
From 200% to 250% the penalty is 20%.
Over 250% the penalty is 30% .21
For example, assume a 50% bracket taxpayer donated to a church
1,000 bibles for which he claimed a value of $25 each. Thus he took a
deduction of $25,000 and reduced his income tax liability by $12,500.
If it is determined that the value of the bibles was only $5 each (perhaps
the price paid) then there would have been a $20,000 valuation over-
statement. The overstatement would have caused a $10,000 understate-
ment of liability. The applicable ratio of claimed value to actual value
is 25,000/5,000 or 500%. Accordingly, the penalty would be 30% of
$10,000 or $3,000.
16 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
17 IRC § 6659(f) (2).
18 IRC § 6659(f)(3).
19 IRC § 6653(c) (1). In essence, an underpayment is the same as a deficiency.
20 IRC § 6659(a).
2 IRC § 6659(b).
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The valuatidn overstatement penalty is not applicable to property that
was held by the taxpayer for more than five years. 22 Nor is the penalty
applicable if the taxpayer's underpayment for the year attributable to
all valuation understatements is less than $1,000.23
The valuation penalty may be waived (in whole or part) upon a
showing that there was a reasonable basis for the amount claimed and
that the claim was made in good faith.24
The valuation overstatement penalty is not directly applicable to the
tax professional. However, it does affect the professional's relationship
with the client. It is, certainly, necessary for the practitioner to be sure
that the client is aware that the penalty exists and to advise that care
should be taken to utilize realistic valuatiops in tax planning and tax
reporting. The tax professional is, further, well advised to be sure to
clarify his role (or the absence of any role) in the determination of the
valuation of property for tax reporting purposes. An after-the-fact dis-
cussion of the allocation of blame for the valuation overstatement pen-
alty is best avoided by clarification of the professional's duty at the time
a return reporting position is taken.
Additional Fraud and Negligence Penalties
Additional penalties for negligence and fraud (1982) have been added
to the Internal Revenue Code. These penalties are cumulative to the
traditional negligence and fraud penalties.
The traditional negligence penalty is 5% of the taxpayer's entire un-
derstatement of tax for the year, if any part of the understatement was
due to negligence or the intentional disregard of rules and regulations.25
The traditional fraud penalty is 50% of the taxpayer's entire understate-
ment 26 for the year, if any part of the understatement was due to fraud.
The new additional negligence penalty is applicable to returns origi-
nally due after 1981.27 The new additional fraud penalty is applicable
to returns originally due after September 3, 1982.28 The new additional
negligence and fraud penalties are both in the amount of 50% of the
interest payable on the amount of the underpayment attributable to the
penalized conduct.29
The operation of these penalties is best illustrated by an example.
Assume a 50% bracket taxpayer who reports taxable income of $50,000
22IRC § 6659(c).
23 IRC § 6659(d).
24 1RC § 6659(e).
25 IRC § 6653(a)(1).
26IRC § 6653(b) (1).
27 Sec. 722(b) (1) (2) of Public Law 97-34 Aug. 13, 1981.
28 Sec. 325(a), (b) of Public Law 97-248, Sept. 3, 1982.
2 9 IRC § 6653(a) (2); 6653(b) (2).
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for 1982. Assume further, that the taxpayer is determined to have
omitted $20,000 of gross receipts and is also determined to have errone-
ously (but nonfraudulently and without negligence) accrued a deduction
for $80,000 in 1982 which should have been deducted in 1983. The
taxpayer would, therefore, have a total 1983 deficiency of $50,000, of
which $10,000 was due to the omitted gross receipts and $40,000 was
due to the erroneous deduction.
If the $20,000 income omission was due to fraud there would be a
tradtional fraud penalty of $25,000, which is 50% of the $50,000 total
deficiency for the year, even though only $10,000 of the deficiency was
due to fraud. Similarly, if the $20,000 income omission was due to
negligence there would be a traditional negligence penalty of $2,500,
being 5 % of the total understatement for the year.
In addition to the traditional fraud or negligence penalty there would
be added a new cumulative penalty equal to 50% of the interest payable
on the understatement due to the penalized conduct. If it is assumed
that at the time the penalty is assessed the interest payable with respect
to the understatement would be 40%, the additional penalty would be
20% of the understatement due to the penalized conduct. In the exam-
ple, the understatement due to the penalized conduct (be it fraud or
negligence) would be $10,000 (50% of the omitted receipts). Accord-
ingly, the additional penalty would be $2,000.
Therefore, under the assumed facts, if there were a fraud penalty im-
posed it would be in the amount of $27,000. If there were a negligence
penalty imposed it would be in the amount of $4,500.
Penalty for Promotion of Abusive Tax Shelters and Injunctions
The penalty for the promotion of an "abusive" tax shelter is poten-
tially applicable to any person who organizes (or assists in organizing)
or who participates in the sale of an interest in any entity, plan or
arrangement.8 0
The penalty will be imposed if any such person makes or furnishes a
statement with respect to the securing of any tax benefit resulting from
the holding of an interest in an entity or participating in a plan or
arrangement which the person knows, or has reason to know, is false or
fraudulent as to a material matter.3 '
The penalty also will be imposed if any such person makes a "gross
valuation overstatement" as to any material matter.32 There is a "gross
valuation statement" if there is a statement as to the value of any prop-
erty or services which is directly related to the amount of any allowable
deduction or credit, and the stated value exceeds 200% of the amount
30 IRC § 6700(a)(1).
31 IRC § 6700(a) (2) (A).
32 IRC § 6700(a) (2) (B).
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determined to -be the correct value. 33 The I.R.S. may waive the gross
valuation overstatement penalty on a showing that the stated value had
a reasonable basis and was made in good faith.34
The amount of the penalty for promotion of an abusive tax shelter is
(in addition to any other applicable penalty) the greater of $1,000 or
ten percent of the gross income derived or to be derived from the
activity of organizing or participating in the sale of interests in the per-
tinent entity, plan or arrangement.3 5 Certainly, there is going to be ample
room for debate as to the correct amount of the penalty in many cases.
In addition to the ability to impose civil penalties, the Service has
been empowered to seek injunctions to prohibit any person from engag-
ing in conduct subject to the penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters.36
An action seeking an injunction can be commenced in the United States
District Court for the district in which the defendant either resides, has
his principal place of business or engaged in conduct violative of Section
6700. 37 If the court finds that the defendant has violated the section and
that an injunction is appropriate to prevent recurrence, the court may
enjoin the defendant from engaging in activties which are violative of
Section 6700.38
The Service in October, 1983, issued Revenue Procedure 83-78 estab-
lishing a procedure for potential actions against promoters of "abusive"
tax shelters, including the assertion of penalties, the seeking of injunc-
tions and the possible issuance of pre-filing letters to the promoter's
investors. These letters are, in effect, warnings to the investor not to
claim the tax benefits promised by the promoter.
The new penalty for the promotion of abusive tax shelters requires
the tax professional engaged in any way in a "promotion" to take pre-
cautions to avoid the possibility of a controversy regarding his liability
for the penalty. Obviously, the professional should not knowingly par-
ticipate in any fraudulent promotion. However, it must be recognized
that where there is discovered to have been a fraudulent statement made,
there can be substantial issues raised as to whether the professional
knew (or had reason to know) of the misstatement. Accordingly, the
professional should do all possible to be beyond accusation. There
should be contemporaneous documentation of the scope of the profes-
sionals' duties with respect to the promotion. The professional should
.
33 1RC § 6700(b) (1).
34 IRC § 6700(b) (2).
35 IRC § 6700(a).
36 IRC § 7408(a).
7 IRC § 7408(a). See also IRC § 7408(c).
38 IRC § 7408(b). See United States v. Buttorff, 563 F. Supp. 450 (N.D. Texas
1983). ("Equity trust device promotor enjoined"); U.S. v. Hutchinson, 51 AFTR
2d 83-1141 (S.D. Calif. 1983). ("Family" trust) U.S. v. Jones, 53 AFTR 2d
84-370 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (Various trusts).
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also take reasonable steps to insure that the statements made regarding
the promotion are correct. Regretfully, since there will always be some
uncertainty as to the degree of investigation required, the professional
can rarely, if ever, be perfectly sure of his position. At a minimum, the
professional should raise questions if he suspects that there might be a
fraud. He must also consider the difficult question of what steps are
appropriate if an ongoing fraud is discovered. Unfortunately, it is im-
possible to present universally applicable guidance as to the proper
steps to take, particularly in the context of an ongoing professional
relationship, where there is a suspicion of fraud. For the present it is
probably necessary to conclude that any participation in a promotion
which turns out to be fraudulent will place the professional in jeopardy
of a penalty proceeding. On the other hand, a failure to meet one's
professional obligation to a client will also create potential liability.
Hence, the professional may well find himself in a possible dilemma in
which the tax law, professional ethical standards, potential civil liability
and even pertinent criminal exposure may all be relevant. The new
compliance environment is a very difficult one for promoters of abusive
tax shelters and, as well, for those who assist them.
The Penalty for Aiding and Abetting An Understatement
Until the enactment of T.E.F.R.A., the Internal Revenue Service had
a criminal, 39 but no civil, sanction available against one who knowingly
aided and abetted the understatement of the tax liability of another.
Now the Service can, in appropriate cases, impose civil sanctions on
such persons.
The penalty for aiding and abetting the understatement of tax is ap-
plicable if a person who aids or assists, procures or advises with respect
to the preparation of a return or other document in connection with a
tax matter. 40 The document (or a portion) will be used in a material
matter arising under the tax laws and will result in the understatement
of another person's liability.41
The penalty can be applicable to a person by virtue of the acts of a
subordinate. This derivative liability can result by virtue of one's order-
ing a subordinate to act in violation of the statute or by knowing of,
and not attempting to prevent, the subordinate from so acting.42 How-
ever, one is not liable for the penalty merely for rendering mechanical
assistance (e.g., typing) in connection with the preparation of the per-
tinent document. 4' As in the analogous criminal statute, the applicability
39 IRC § 7206(2).
40 IRC § 6701(a) (1).
41IRC § 6701(a) (2) (3).
42 IRC § 6701(c).
43 IRC § 6701(e).
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of the civil penalty is not dependent upon knowledge by the taxpayer
that the subject tax return is false.41
The amount of the penalty is determined by the number of docu-
ments, taxpayers and taxable periods concerned. Basically, the penalty
is $1,000 ($10,000 if it relates to a corporation's tax liability) with
respect to each document, limited by the restriction that there will be
only one penalty per taxpayer per taxable period.45 Thus, if two penal-
ized documents are provided to a single taxpayer for a given taxable
year, there would be only a single penalty of $1,000 (or $10,000 for a
corporation). If a given taxpayer is provided with two documents which
relate to two taxable years the total penalty would be $2,000 (or
$20,000 for a corporation). The providing of penalized Forms K-1 to
each of 50 partners for a given year would result in penalties of $50,000
(or more if there are corporate partners). It can be anticipated that the
I.R.S. will take the position that a single penalized document which
pertains to the tax liabilities of two taxpayers will be subject to a $2,000
penalty (or $20,000 if corporate taxpayers are involved).
The penalty imposed by Section 6701 is in addition to any other
penalty which may be imposed.4 6 Hence, it is possible that this penalty
could be imposed, in appropriate circumstances, together with the pen-
alty for promotion of an abusive tax shelter.
The tax professional should, clearly, avoid the knowing participation
in the preparation of a document which would subject him to this pen-
alty. This is obvious. However, it is sometimes less obvious to a third
party (particularly the I.R.S.) that a professional who had anything
whatsoever to do with the preparation of a false document did not know
of the falsity. Hence, in every aspect of tax practice the professional
must take precautions to avoid involvement or even apparent involve-
ment in improper actions. Here again, the tax professional who prepares
any document in connection with a tax matter must take precautions to
define the scope of his responsibility for the accuracy of the document.
He should also not overlook obvious indications that any document
material to a tax matter is not accurate.
The Penalty for a Substantial Understatement of Liability
In T.E.F.R.A. Congress created a new standard of tax return report-
ing which must be met in order to. avoid a civil tax penalty. The "no
44 IRC § 6701(d).
45 IRC § 6701(b).
4 G IRC § 6701(f) (1). If a person is penalized under this provision with respect
to a document, he cannot also be penalized under the return preparer penalties
for the negligent and willful understatement of liability with respect to the same
document, IRC § 6701(f) (2).
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fault" penalty for a substantial understatement of liability4" may be
applicable even though a taxpayer is neither negligent nor fraudulent.
The penalty may be imposed for any "substantial understatement" of
income tax, in an amount equal to 10% of the underpayment due to
the "substantial understatement." The penalty is a "no fault" penalty in
the sense that it may be applicable without regard to the taxpayer's
intent. If there is a "substantial understatement" the penalty is imposed
unless one of the criteria for escaping it is met.
An "understatement" is defined as the excess of the amount required
to be shown due on a return over the amount shown due on the return
less any permissible reduction. 9 Thus, if a taxpayer reports a $20,000
liability and it is determined that the tax liability which should have
been shown on the return was $45,000, there would be a $25,000
"understatement," subject to possible reduction for penalty purposes.
A "substantial" understatement adequate to trigger the penalty is one
which exceeds the greater of 10% of the amount required to be shown
due on the return or $5,000 50 (for a corporation other than an S cor-
poration or personal holding company, $10,000). 51 Therefore, if for an
individual it was determined that the correct tax liability was $45,000
and the tax liability shown due on the return was $20,000, the threshold
amount to trigger liability for the penalty would be $5,000, since 10%
of the amount required to be shown on the return would be only $4,500.
On the other hand, if for an individual the correct determined tax lia-
bility was $90,000, then the threshold amount to trigger the penalty
would be an understatement of $9,000, since 10% of the $90,000 re-
quired to be shown on the return is greater than $5,000.
If there is an understatement initially large enough to meet the thresh-
hold for application of the penalty, consideration must be given to
whether the understatement is subject to reduction for penalty purposes.
An understatement will, of course, result from one or more items of
adjustment to the tax return as filed. Hence, each item of adjustment
contributing to the understatement must be analyzed to see whether it
can qualify for reduction, i.e., escape from penalty.
The relevant standards to be met in order for an item to qualify for a
reduction of the understatement penalty depend upon whether the item
is attributable to a "tax shelter." Hence, as to each item of adjustment
one must first determine whether the item in question is a "tax shelter"
item.
A "tax shelter" is defined in the statute as a partnership or other
entity, plan or arrangement which has as its principal purpose the
47 IRC § 6661.
48 IRC§ 6661(a).
49 IRC § 6661 (b) (2).5oIRC § 6661(b) (1) (A).
51 IRC § 6661(b) (1) (B).
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avoidance or evasion of federal income tax.5 2 There can be considerable
debate as to whether a given entity, plan or arrangement is a "tax shel-
ter" under the statutory definition. In Proposed Regulations the Internal
Revenue Service has indicated its view that:
"Typical of tax shelters are transactions structured with little
or no motive for the realization of economic gain, which utilize
the mismatching of income and deductions, overvalued assets,
or assets with values subject to substantial uncertainty, non-
recourse financing, financing techniques which do not conform
to standard commercial business practices, or the mischarac-
terization of the substance of the transaction." 53
On the other hand the Service takes the position that:
"[T]he principal purpose of an entity or arrangement is not
the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax if the entity,
plan, or arrangement has (sic) its purpose, the claiming of
exclusions from income, accelerated deductions or other tax
benefits in a manner consistent with the Congressional
purpose." 54
It can be difficult, obviously, to predict with certainty whether a given
item is or is not a tax shelter item.
If an understatement is attributable to an item which is not a tax
shelter item, then for penalty purposes the understatement is reduced
with respect to that item if there exists or existed "substantial authority"
for the taxpayer's reporting, '55 or the "relevant facts" were adequately
disclosed on or with the return.5
"Substantial authority" is a new term. It is not defined in the statute
and was designed to be an entirely new standard. The definition of this
new and important phrase will have to be discerned from future
developments.
For there to be "substantial authority", first there must be "authority."
"Authority" in the view of the I.R.S. would include the Code, Regula-
tions, judicial decisions, official administrative announcements such as
published Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures, official statements
of Congressional intent and the like.57 "Authority" would not include
52 1RC § 6661(b) (2) (C) (ii).
53 Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-5(b) (1).
54 Proposed Reg. § 1.6661-5(b) (2).
55IRC § 6661(b)(2)(B)(1). The I.R.S. view is that "substantial authority"
must exist with respect to the issues of fact as well as law. Proposed Regs.
§ 1.6661-3(d).
56 IRC § 6661(b)(2) (B) (ii).5TProposed Regs. § 1.6661-3(b) (2).
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conclusions reached in the opinions of tax professionals, treatises, legal
periodicals, and even Internal Revenue actions of less than published
Ruling or Revenue Procedure statute;r8 for example, a private letter
ruling. A document which does not, in the view of the Service, rise to
the level of "authority" may nevertheless be relevant in determining
whether there is "authority" because of its inherent persuasiveness or
because of the fact that it, itself, is based upon authority.5 9
If there is some "authority" for the taxpayer's reporting position, the
question whether there exists "substantial" authority requires a weighing
process. The bottom line is whether the authority in favor of the tax-
payer's position is "substantial" when weighed against the authority
opposed to it.60 This does not mean that the taxpayer's position must be
more likely than not correct, but it does mean that it must be something
more than a "reasonable basis" position sufficient to avoid the tradi-
tional negligence penalty.61 As stated in the Proposed Regulations:
6 2
"The taxpaper's position must be stronger than one which is
arguable but fairly unlikely to prevail in court."
The understatement as to which the penalty may be imposed may be
reduced for a non-tax shelter item (even absent substantial authority)
if the taxpayer makes an "adequate disclosure" of the "relevant facts." 63
The disclosure may be on, or with, the tax return in question. The
Service has taken a position in Proposed Regulations with regard to
what will constitute adequate disclosure. In general terms, an adequate
disclosure is made if there is an attachment to the tax return which is
clearly labeled as a Section 6661 disclosure, which identifies the item,
the amount of the item and the facts affecting the tax treatment of the
item that reasonably may be expected to apprise the Internal Revenue
Service of the nature of the potential controversy regarding the tax
treatment of the item.34 More detailed rules regarding what is, and what
is not, an adequate disclosure are in the process of development at this
writing.65
If an item is classified as a "tax shelter" item there will be no reduc-
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-3(b) (1).
61 Id.
621Id.
63 IRC § 6661(b) (2) (B) (ii).
64 Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-4(b).
65 See, for example, Rev. Proc. 83-21, I.R.B. 83-13, in which there is deemed
automatic disclosure for penalty purposes of certain items provided specified forms
and attachments to returns are properly completed. As to the adequate disclosure
of pass-thru adjustments (from an entity return) see Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-4(c);
1.6661-6(b).
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tion of the understatement by virtue of any disclosure. 6 In order to
obtain a reduction of the understatement due to a tax shelter item,
there must not only exist substantial authority but also a reasonable
belief that the reported tax treatment was "more likely than not" cor-
rect.6 As a result, for a tax shelter item, it is necessary as a practical
matter for most taxpayers to have the opinion of a professional upon
whom they can reasonably rely, which states that the tax return report-
ing position is more likely than not correct. 8 It should be noted that
the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position, in Proposed Regu-
lations, that with respect to a tax shelter item attributable to a pass-
through entity (partnership, S corporation or a trust), the entity (not
the taxpayer who would be subject to penalty) must have a reasonable
"more likely than not" belief. 9 Thus, in the I.R.S. view, the reasonable
belief of the taxpayer on whom the penalty would be imposed is not
relevant.70
The penalty for a substantial understatement may be waived (in
whole or part) by the Internal Revenue Service on a showing that there
was reasonable cause for the understatement and that the taxpayer
acted in good faith.7 ' The I.R.S. has taken the position in Proposed
Regulations that:
... [R]eliance on an information return or on the advice of a
professional (such as an appraiser, an attorney or accountant)
will not of itself constitute a showing of a reasonable cause or
good faith. Rather, circumstances which may indicate reason-
able cause and good faith include, for example, an honest
misunderstanding of the facts or law that is reasonable in light
of the experience and education of the taxpayer. Thus, an in-
advertent error as to a matter of fact that is reasonable under
all the circumstances would, in general, indicate reasonable
cause and good faith .7 2
The I.R.S. has announced a "voluntary disclosure" policy with re-
spect to the substantial understatement penalty. In essence, a "qualified
amended return" which reports additional tax or makes an adequate
disclosure will be treated as if it had been the originally filed return. 73
A qualified amended return must be filed before the taxpayer is first
GG IRC § 6661(b) (2) (C) (i) (I).
G7 IRC § 6661(b) (2) (C) (i) (II).
68 Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-5(d). The opinion of a professional is not, however,
absolutely required. Id.
GO Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-5(e).
70Id.
71IRC § 6661(c).
72 Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-6(a).
7 3 Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-6(c) (1).
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contacted concerning examination of the return and before any person
potentially liable for the Section 6700 penalty (for promotion of abusive
tax shelters) is first contacted regarding an action which affects the tax-
payer's return. 74
The Service will also provide an automatic waiver with respect to
pass-through non-tax shelter items if the taxpayer makes a prescribed
type of disclosure which, in effect, constitutes a surrogate disclosure
"on behalf of" the entity.75
The substantial understatement penalty has substantially changed the
relationship between the I.R.S., the taxpayer and the tax professional.
Taxpayers may well tend to look to the tax professional, whether in the
role of advisor or of tax return preparer, as responsible for the avoidance
of the penalty. Certainly, it is important for the professional to clarify
to the client the extent to which a plan or tax return reporting position
may be vulnerable to the penalty. Where the professional cannot assure
the client that a tax return will not be subject to penalty, the client
should be warned. If not, there can be recriminations (or worse) if the
penalty is imposed. In view of the many uncertainties inherent in regard
to any tax return of even modest complexity and the I.R.S. view that an
"innocent" taxpayer can be penalized for an error on a pass-thru entity
return, there are few situations in which a client can be assured that his
return will not be subject to a penalty in the event of a substantial
(10%) adjustment on examination.
Some Observations for the Tax Professional
As noted herein, there is a new tax compliance environment. The tax
professional is far more vulnerable to the I.R.S. and taxpayers than
previously. There can no longer be aggressive planning and reporting
without concern for penalty exposure for the taxpayer and/or the pro-
fessional. Indeed, the substantial increase in the I.R.S. civil penalty
arsenal renders it likely that penalty considerations will be a part of
many tax examinations involving what the I.R.S. perceives to be aggres-
sive reporting or "abusive" tax shelter planning.
One can, at this juncture, provide little general guidance to the tax
professional functioning in the new environment. However, one can
observe that the best solution to a problem is the avoidance of the
problem in the first place. Obviously, the professional must in fact not
commit improper actions. However, in order to avoid controversy he
must do what he can to make it clear that he is not responsible for any
improprieties which may be committed by others.
The life of the tax professional in the new compliance environment
is not an easy one. The professional is subject to duties to the client,
IU Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-6(c)(2).
7 Proposed Regs. § 1.6661-6(b).
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the Internal Revenue Service, the accounting and/or legal profession
and occasionally to others as well. These duties are, sometimes, incon-
sistent. Moreover, when the practitioner finds himself (albeit innocently)
in any way connected with an improper activity there may be difficult
choices to make regarding the correct course of action.
Regretfully, one must conclude that the new compliance environment
presents problems for which there may be no perfectly correct solution
for the taxpayer and/or the tax professional. It may well be that the
professional must now devote a portion (in some cases a substantial
portion) of his efforts to the avoidance of potential liability for a pos-
sible penalty.
In conclusion, it can be noted that it remains to -be seen whether the
new tax compliance environment will promote greater taxpayer com-
pliance. Certainly, it should promote greater self protective efforts on
the part of tax professionals. For better, or worse, in this new environ-
ment, the tax professional must consider the Garbis Law of Survival:
"If you can't completely solve a tax compliance problem, at least make
it someone else's."
